Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Natural Law Forum

1-1-1957

Books Reviewed
Anton-Hermann Chroust
Zygmunt Epstein
Conrad L. Kellenberg
Bernard J. Ward

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Chroust, Anton-Hermann; Epstein, Zygmunt; Kellenberg, Conrad L.; and Ward, Bernard J., "Books Reviewed" (1957). Natural Law
Forum. Paper 22.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/22

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

BOOKS

REVIEWED

RECHTSDENKEN. By Erik Wolf. Vols. I, II, III, and 1112.*
Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1950-56. Pp. 435,
494, 336 and 432. DM. 148.00.

GRIECHISCHES

This is one of the rare works which it is almost an impossibility to review,
and almost an impertinence to praise or criticize. The author, whose amazing
learning at times is simply overwhelming, proposes nothing less than to write a
comprehensive and, in a way, conclusive presentation, analysis, and interpolation
of the whole of legal (or, perhaps better, lego-philosophical) thought which from
the "mythological age" down to the Macedonian conquest preoccupied the
mind and the emotions of the Hellenic peoples. All this Professor Wolf accomplishes against the background of an astonishing array of factual information
mastered with great dexterity, superb scholarship and, one suspects, loving care.
Hence any reviewer, unless he intends to write a companion volume, must confine
himself to a few basic observations. But the more the interested reader penetrates
into the subject which Wolf discusses so splendidly and competently, the more
he is tempted to say something about it; and this not so much in the spirit of
disagreement as by way of a quiet scholarly conversation over a tremendously
important and at the same time exceedingly fascinating problem.
In his introductory remarks Wolf cautions the reader not to interpret or
"understand" the texts and traditions of early Greek myths or pre-Socratic authors
in the spirit of our own time. The traditional "classical" (whatever that means),
Scholastic, Romantic, or humanistic interpretative approaches to early Greek
thought, the author rightly maintains, only too readily succumb to the danger
of falsifying the original meaning'of these texts or traditions by reading into
them concepts, conceptions, ideas, ideals, and even prejudices (including our
own greatly tainted Weltanschauung) which were totally alien to the early Greeks.
Hence we must try to comprehend, through intuitive insights and direct apprehension, the actual messages which these old sayings convey, rather than evaluate (and
distort) them in the light of what they mean to us and to our standards of value.
The whole problem, then, comes down to this: direct apprehension (Wesenschau)
will have to take the place of valuation, and Nachfiihlung (perhaps Nachdichtung) that of interpretation. Thus, ultimately, the author opens up the bewildering and, possibly, never fully to be answered problems of semantics, limitations of
intercommunication, analogy and translation. In keeping with his plea for
immediate comprehension and direct apprehension in the sense of "Wesenschau,"
Wolf subjects the early Greek texts, many of them fragmentary and extremely
obscure, at least to the ordinary reader, to a thorough "revision" and "retrans* VOL. IV

is still in preparation.
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lation," with the result that in not a few instances his findings differ considerably
from the traditional and commonly accepted renditions.
Whether, on the whole, the "revisions" suggested by the author-which are
often as challenging as they are original--can and will be accepted without
reservations, is not for the reviewer to say. Steeped in the traditional approach,
the reviewer at times finds it somewhat difficult and even impossible fully to
concur with some of these "revisions," especially since the author frequently
seems to ignore the very canons which he himself establishes in his introduction
and to which he commits himself univocally. To be more specific, Wolf is
to a large extent influenced by, and perhaps even dependent on, the existentialist
philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, and the particular nomenclature coined and used by them. This becomes apparent, to cite but one instance,
in his statement 1 that the Dike "das einem jeden Seienden wesenhaft Zukommende erfiillt . . . es zu sich selbst . . . zu seiner Entfaltung . . . und zu seinem
Vergehen . .. zu bringen weiss ...

Dike ist ...

diejenige Ordnungsmacht, welche

das Wesen der Menschen und Dinge zu [ihrer] Reife bringt und dafiir sorgt,
dass ein legliches nicht nur 'zu seiner Zeit' (wenn es "zeitig'ist) geschieht, sondern
auch ('zuletzt') von 'seiner Stunde' ereilt wird." In another connection 2 he
refers to the Dike as "das lichtende und richtende, Ordnung ordnepde und
Geordnetes erhaltende Wesen"; and "indem sie 'anwest,' geschieht was '&"'
ist." But this kind of ontological interpretation, aside from its poetical beauty,
definitely contains a rank anachronism, in that it constitutes "das Sein des Seienden" or "das Wesen" as the essence of everything. Viewed in this manner, the
original Dike, this really incomprehensible factor, becomes "durchschaubar"
(rationally comprehensible) and even rational in the sense of later philosophies.
It might be appropriate here to point out that language in general, both in its
simplicity as well as complexity, is a reflection of mental operations. This reflection can be, and incidentally is, manifested in diversity of ways. Every new
linguistic concept fundamentally represents a new intellectual creation. Consequently, no concept of one language or one epoch is simply transferable to another.
This fact is brought home most convincingly whenever we deal with the texts of
the mythological age.
In the opinion of the reviewer the Dike, like the Themis, is an essentially
vague "religious" term-"religious" in the sense of emotional commitment-and
like the ultimate rationale of all things, basically "undurchschaubar" and incomprehensible except to the "inspired." It is, at least for us, an "irrational" or,
better, "metarational" force which cannot simply be reduced to a rational
principle or concept. In short, it is not a noetic problem as the author tries to
make it out, for noetics is a relatively late phenomenon; but a "metanoetic" or
"paranoetic vision." Dike as a universal principle or concept is definitely a
Stoic notion. The same criticism could be applied to Wolf's interpretation and
discussion of Heraclitus of Ephesus, to mention one other instance. Despite the
author's assertion 3 that he proposes to let Heraclitus speak for himself without
1.
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2.

Id. 339.

3. 1 WOLF, op. cit. at 237.

209.
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committing him to any preconceived philosophical valuation, the reviewer
strongly suspects that Wolf is here under the spell of Josef Brecht's thesis that
Heraclitus was the "first existentialist." Be this as it may, Wolf's novel and
certainly challenging renditions of the Heraclitean fragments fairly smack of
existentialist notions cloaked in the characteristic existentialist nomenclature of
Heidegger, such as "Schein der Erscheinung," ".west," "entwest," "Zuteilung des
Zukommenden," "das Unzukrmmliche," "das Unbegriffene," "Entwesung," "das
Imrechtsein des Seienden," "Verfasstheit des Wesens," and "in Unordnung
befindliches Unwesen." 4
Perhaps Wolf is oblivious of the possibly "shamanic" background of early
Greek mythology (and early Greek "philosophy"). In the further elaboration of
this "shamanic theme" the reviewer wishes to recall, for instance, that Lucretius
once compared the pronouncements of the earliest Greek philosophers to the
obscure and often incomprehensible oracles of Apollo, the patron of the inspired
but not necessarily rational, consistent, or intelligible seer of old. The same
Lucretius also hails what he calls the poetry of Empedocles as the voice of a
divinely inspired genius who proclaimed his insights and decrees of fate in such
a way that he could hardly be called a mortal man, and with more certainty
and sanctity than any delivered by the Pythian prophetess. This picture of
Empedocles, as drawn by Lucretius, is one of a man capable of intuitive divination, second insights (which become manifest in visions and dreams); of a mystic's
commerce with the divine, and capable of displaying the "artistic temperament"
usually ascribed by ancient tradition to the inspired or "mad" poet. Thus,
according to Lucretius, Empedocles was really a prophet-seer, poet, and savant
(philosopher) all in one: he was, in other words, a prototype of the original
"prophet-poet-savant" combination.
Needless to say, this complex prototype is essentially the Eurasian shaman
(the old bard, the Roman rates, the Gallic druid, the old Irish fill, the Welsh
Awenithion, the Nordic Thulr, the Indian Kavi), that inspired prophet-seer,
wonderworker, poet, and savant who, while in a fit of divinely inspired madness,
interprets the past, prophesies the future, and reveals the mysterious and incomprehensible workings of the gods in solemn and usually obscure poetic (hieratic)
words. The prophet-poet-savant of old had no voOq, but he was possessed of
divine inspiration which, incidentally, constitutes the oldest, though certainly
metalogical "theory of knowledge." This knowledge is an exclusive "gift of
heaven." In our own time, according to the reports of Professor H. M. Chadwick,
the Siberian shaman, this heir of the original shaman, still says about himself:
"The gods, with whom I confer and whose commands I understand and heed,
have appointed me that I must wander beneath, upon and above the earth ....
I am the shaman, who knows the past and the future and everything that
happens in the present, beneath, upon and above the earth. And I speak about
these things with authority and in an exalted language. For the gods speak
through me." But does this not sound like some of the orphic-mythological
pronouncements? And when the Siberian shaman (or baksha), with one or
4. Some interesting observations concerning the nature of the Heraclitean Dike can be
found in G. S. KIRK, HERAcLITUS: THE COSMIC FRAGMENTS 127 ff. (Cambridge, 1954).
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several companions, journeys to the heavens (or the underworld) on the back
of a goose, raven, or horse to visit Erlik Khan in order to receive instructions from
the deity, he does nothing more than King Minos, who every so often visited
his divine father in the Idaean cave in order to receive instructions in matters of
law and government. This shamanic journey is duplicated by Parmenides, who
in his Way of Truth tells us that he travelled on a chariot, attended by the
daughters of the Sun, on the way of the deity which conducts the man who knows
"as far as the heart desires" and "far from the beaten track of men." And beyond
the gates of Day and Night, he met the goddess who promised to instruct him
in all things. In his Purification, to mention just another instance, Empedocles,
who in this displays a great affinity with Pythagoras, Pherekides, and Epimenides,
contends that during his many reincarnations he had been "born in all manner
of life: I have been a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird, and a dumb fish in the
sea." But the same is also claimed by the Asiatic shaman, the Celtic bard, and
the Norse Othin. To continue the parallel between the shaman and the early
Greek poets: Musaeus, the inspired poet-seer, is said to have flown through the
air by the favor of Boreas, and the Hyperborean Abaris flew around the world
on his magic arrow, feats which are also claimed by the Eurasian shaman. Hence
it is probably "shamanic inspiration" received while in a magic trance which
furnishes the background and the original meaning of the earliest Greek "literature," be it the first theogonic or cosmogonic poems, the minstrelsy of the
Homeric cycle, the didactic poetry of Hesiod, the sayings ascribed to the so-called
Seven Wise Men, or the "aphorisms" of the "obscure" Heraclitus of Ephesus.
Perhaps even the Platonic anamnesis is but a sophisticated rendition of the
shamanic visits with the deity.
Be this as it may, what really matters are two basic facts: first, it is not
so much a question of whether an individual person of the Greek mythological
age, such as Orpheus, Epimenides, Musaeus, Abaris, or Salmoxis ever existed.
What concerns us here is the fact that certain attributes (prophet, seer, poet,
savant) always seem to belong together and cohere in a recurrent type which is
most aptly described as the shamanic type. Secondly, although the vocabulary
of these prophet-poet-savants appears to be our own and their diction seems to
be familiar, the mold as well as the literary formulae in which this vocabulary
or diction is cast is alien to the traditional mold in which ordinary, especially
modern secular thought is transmitted. For does not Plato himself admit that
"in their rapt condition" the poets "say many true things, but do not know
what they mean"? In other words, while we apparently possess their vocabulary
and their diction, we do not any longer fully understand what these inspired or
"mad" shamanic men (or women) were talking about. Such limitations on our
part, the reviewer believes, must also be accepted by Wolf, and this despite his
valiant efforts to penetrate beyond the limits of the justifiably incomprehensible
and perhaps ineffable.
One must also bear in mind that the cosmogonies and theogonies, from which
the author derives some of the earliest forms of Greek legal thought, contain
elements which are the outcome not of immediate experience or observation, but
rather the products of shamanic visions or "revelations." They enshrine elements
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of great antiquity whose origin was already unknown to the poet or poets who
transmitted them. But they retained the sacred and, hence, mysterious character
of early religion and religious revelation. From the sixth century B.C. onwards
they were assailed with increasing frequency by philosophers and moralists. Like
the unedifying parts of other traditions or "revelations," they were not fully
abandoned, but rather "defended" by the expedient of allegorical interpretation.
(And this is exactly what Wolf seems to do in his work.) A deeply religious
poet like Aeschylus could discover a profoundly moral significance even in what
he had to consider the "amorality"-"amoral" from an "enlightened" nonmythological or, perhaps, "sophisticated" standpoint-of the gods. It is not
unreasonable to conjecture that, however enlightened or progressive the Greek
poets and philosophers of the fifth century B.C. might have been, they could
never entirely throw off the weight of authority invested in the magnificent
though often obscure (and therefore probably attractive) language of the old
shamanic prophet-poet-savants. But then, again, later Greek philosophy and
poetry is not a motherless Athena, an entirely new discipline breaking in from
nowhere upon a culture hitherto dominated by shamanic prophet-poet-savants.
Although the process of rationalization had been at work for some time before
Thales of Miletus, the presumed "first philosopher," made his appearance, the,
figures and themes no less than the vocabulary and diction of the shamanic
period survived and even re-emerged in the later systems. We have but to
remember the Love and Strife of Empedocles or the ghost of a creator in the
vof of Anaxagoras. Down to Aristotle Greek philosophy presents a number
of features which cannot be attributed to rational inference based on
open-minded observation of facts, but must be ascribed to lingering shamanic traditions.
To return to the Themis-Dike problem for a moment: Wolf does not, it
seems, pay sufficient attention to the fact that Themis and Dike, to mention only
two of his "Satzungen" (the reviewer doubts that this term is an appropriate
translation of Themis or Dike), are essentially two religions, incomprehensible and
ineffable, but nevertheless apparently real and efficient "forces" which in an unintelligible manner operate throughout a chaotically polytheistic universe. Themis
and Dike cannot possibly be reduced to a single principle or standard of comprehension or pcrhaps to "Satzungen." Neither does the author sufficiently recognize
the dichotomy or "dualism" of (the older) Titanic gods and (the newer) Olympian gods-a dichotomy which, together with other polytheistic notions, to a
large degree is responsible for tragic conflicts and paradoxical situations. One
may even maintain that the Grundmotiv of Greek polytheism, at least in its
earlier form, is of necessity the paradox and its practical concomitant, the
tragedy. Aside from the dualism of Titanic gods and Olympian gods, the ThemisDike problem also seems to reflect the many tensions caused by the transition from
matriarchate to patriarchate in early Greek society with all its sociologically
upsetting and confusing effects. This, among other matters, is also brought
out by Sophocles' Antigone, where a Titanic Stim and an Olympian St'"
collide with the tragic result that Antigone, a mere pawn of mightier forces, is
crushed-a fate which she accepts without flinching or lament. And finally, in
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the opinion of the reviewer, the kindred group or clan meaning of the Titanic
(matriarchal) Themis, as contrasted by the polis meaning of the Olympian
Dike, on which Wolf barely touches in his discussion of Tyrtaeus,5 is not
sufficiently stressed by the author.
In the opinion of the reviewer, Themis, Dike, etc., to which the Homeric
epics no less than the great tragedies of the fifth century B.C. refer, are, at least
for the uninitiated (and are not we all really "uninitiated"?), variations of a kind
of blindly working and, hence, irrational compulsion operating according to
some incomprehensible designs of mystical powers, which are external and,
therefore, equally incomprehensible to the average man. The pre-Olympian
Themis, who is both a personal goddess and an impersonal "compulsion," is
somewhat related to the pre-polis (matriarchal) society. But Themis and
Themis-law also embody the belief in a pre-ordained fate in which man's total
existence is inextricably enmeshed. The later Zeus or Olympian tradition, which
is also related to the polis (patriarchal) society, adopted and adapted the Themis
and thus paved the way for an incomprehensible conflict between Themis-law
and Zeus-law. The Olympian Dike, likewise a personal goddess and an impersonal "compulsion," sees to it that "every one receives his due," that "everything
reaches its pre-ordained ('just') fulfilment," and that "every assignment is met,"
including the "assignments" of the Themis. Like the Titanic Themis, the
Olympian Dike cannot be reduced to a simple rational principle in the philosophical sense of the term. Themis and, perhaps to a lesser degree Dike, also
signify "surrender" to what ordinary man cannot fully grasp but somehow
dimly accepts as inescapable. But whatever Themis or Dike may mean to us,
we must always bear in mind that the various and often conflicting characteristics
traditionally attributed to Themis and Dike date from many of the most ancient
legends of immemorial antiquity down to the sophisticated and already somewhat skeptic interpretations of Euripides.
The reviewer's eye caught an interesting footnote 6 in which the author
states: "It is not likely that Hesiod had any immediate knowledge of the sayings
of the Old Testament.

But according to F. Domseiff . . . there existed 'an

ancient near-eastern literary tradition' with which Hesiod was acquainted."
Hesiod's Theogony, in the main, is a Hymn to Zeus, prefaced by a short cosmogony. A comparison of Hesiod's Hymn to Zeus and the (much older)
Babylonian Hymn to Marduk (Enuma ehts) will divulge at once the striking
dependence of the former on the latter.- There naturally exist some discrepancies,
but these discrepancies are less compelling than the similarities, and even less than
might be expected when we consider the fact that the Babylonian story. reached
Hesiod in fragmentary form through several intermediaries and detached from
the ritual which explained it and gave it coherence. It must also be remembered
that the preserved form of the Hymn to Marduk is only one version of the
Babylonian religious myth, and that it is known to be a revision of a still earlier
Sumerian version. The recent discovery of the Hittite-Hurrian Epic of Kumarbi,
which is really nothing other than a Hittite-Hurrian version of the Babylonian
5.
6.

Id. 313.
Id. 121, note 3.
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Hymn to Marduk, seems to provide the much needed connecting link between
the Babylonian myth and the Hesiodic adaptation. Minoan or perhaps Mycaenean
travellers or traders who, as we know now, were in constant contact with the
Hittites at Ugarit, the great trading center and meeting place of the MinoanAegean peoples and the Hittites, or, at a later date, at al-Mina, probably carried
the Hittite-Hurrian version of the Babylonian-Sumerian Hymn to Marduk to
Crete (where it might have gone through a Minoan phase, as indeed the
Cretan legends of the birth and death of Zeus and the Paliokastro Hymn to
the Greatest Lord suggest), and from Crete to the Greek mainland where it
became the model for Hesiod's Hymn to Zeus or Theogony. Hence the Hesiodic
Hymn to Zeus is essentially an adaptation of the Babylonian-Sumerian Hymn
to Marduk through the intermediary of the Hittite-Hurrian Epic of Kumarbi.
Features common to all three forms are the forcible separation of Heaven and
Earth, the conflict of the different divine generations, the old god's attempt to
destroy the younger generation (in Kumarbi and Hesiod he devours them), and
the castration episode. From the Epic of Kumarbi, but not from the Hymn
of Marduk, Hesiod borrowed the story of the fertilization of the Earth by the
severed genitals of the old god; the image of the stone-baby; and the figure
of Upelluri, a Hurrian Atlas who supports sky and earth.
In order to do complete justice to the so-called Sophists and their contributions to Greek legal thought it may be well to realize that the "Sophistic
movement" or "Sophistic enlightment" is also a far-reaching sociological and
political phenomenon. The Greek peoples, especially the Athenians, stirred by
the stem experiences of the Persian wars, gradually began to learn the practical
value of knowledge and the significance of practical "know-how." This realization, in a way, brought knowledge to the market place. People, in ever larger
numbers and with ever greater intensity began to seek more information on the
many questions which disturbed them. They demanded counsel, assistance as
well as guidance in the many issues presented by an ever more complicated and
complex life. At the same time, closer contacts with different and often older
cultures began to undermine beliefs and ideas which for a long time had been
considered unassailable. Concurrently with this development the realization
waxed stronger that in all walks of life the man of knowledge was more capable,
more useful, and certainly more successful than his ignorant counterpart. Especially in the domain of public (democratic) activity, so important during the
fifth century B.C., independent thinking, individual initiative, personal judgment,
and persuasive eloquence began to replace time-honored customs and ;traditions.
This novel and perplexing situation, which as often as not was deplored and
even maligned by the opponents of change, in the main had a wholesome effect
in that it threw into the open the most guarded and often most distorted "secrets"
and problems of total human existence. Publicity and public agitation rather
than secrecy and mysterious authority became something of a general and
widespread obsession, and it was the immortal achievement of the Sophists
to have "demystified" much of what hitherto, perhaps purposely, had been kept
from an overawed and essentially docile multitude. This essential fact must always
be kept in mind whenever we try to evaluate the Sophistic concern with law
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and justice. Frequently this concern was not so much an attempt at "constructive
reform" as a destructive critique of existing social conditions.
The Sophists did all this partly in response to a general demand of the
time, partly from the noble impulse of freeing men from the bonds of ignorance
and superstition, and partly as a lucrative business which simply capitalized on
the general (and perhaps democratic) insistence on a greater share in knowledge.
Thus it happened that in a relatively short span of time not only the social significance of knowledge, but also many of its basic aspects, tendencies, functions, and
problems, as well as their solutions, were fundamentally not to say radically
changed. Knowledge turned into a social power as well as a determining factor
in political life; and in so doing it became engrossed with the paramount demands
of both theoretical and practical thought and, especially, with the questions of
legal, political, and social existence. It is here, above all, that we must seek for
the beginnings of the Sophistic interest and search into the province, nature, and
function of the law. Naturally, in their predominantly anthropocentric orientation the Sophists would relate law essentially to secular man living in a secular
society and thus for the first time thrust "human nature" into the center of the
legal orbit. This attempted integration of human nature and law of necessity
led to a series of complications and conflicts, especially since no agreement on
the essential nature of man apparently could be reached; and the crucial antithesis of "justice according to nature (or human nature)" and "justice according
to (positive) law," which was created by these Sophists, has never ceased to
preoccupy philosophers and jurists.
The reviewer cannot agree with Nestle's interpretation, which Wolf seems to
accept, namely, that Protagoras' famous statement, "Man is the measure of all
things," refers primarily to "social" or "political" man. If we can rely at all on
Plato, Theaetetus 152A: "Does he [scil. Protagoras] not say that things are to you
as they appear to you; and to me as they appear to me; and that you and I are
men?"-then Protagoras must have referred to individual man both in his theoretical as well as practical aspects, and not merely to "social" or "political" man
or, perhaps, to the genus man. To restrict the Protagorean dictum to "social" or
"political" man would also eliminate the epistemological or theoretical relativism
of Protagoras for which, according to tradition, he has become famous. The
reviewer suspects that Nestle's view is probably tainted by what Aristotle 7 had
to say about v" q and "pta.
It is also surprising to see that the author failed to realize that Gorgias' Defense
of Palamedes probably furnished the model for Plato's Apology of Socrates
(even in antiquity Plato was accused of plagiarism); and perhaps only a
person trained in the Anglo-American common law tradition might appreciate
Gorgias' statement that the trained orator-the forensic orator, advocate, or
"lawyer"-should replace the traditional lay "judge" or "legislator." He who
knows the traditions of the common law knows also that its history should be
written not so much in a setting of wonderworkers, kings, legislators, and courts,
but against the background of great lawyers and great legal practitioners. For
is it not true that the grandeur that once was Rome is actually the grandeur
7. POLITICS 1280 b 10 ff. NiCOMACHEAN ETHICS 1133 a 29; 1134 b 35.
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that was the Roman law? and that the grandeur of the Roman law was the immortal achievement of the great Roman jurists and jurisconsults? And what holds true
for the Roman law is certainly true for the Anglo-American common law, which
is essentially a lawyer's law. Of all the legal systems which Western civilization
has developed in its long history only two have escaped the oblivion of time,
namely, the Roman law (in the modern civil law) and the common law. They
have continued to flourish exactly because they were "lawyer's law." Hence
Gorgias' remark that "lawyers"-in ancient Athens the forensic orator in a way
took the place of the present-day lawyer-should replace lay judges (heliasts
untrained in the law) and lay legislators is, after all, not without merit. It
merely enunciates a position, not uncommon among Sophists (and, incidentally,
popular with Plato, Xenophon, and others), that the experienced and skilled
person should be given preference over the inexperienced and unskilled person.
The reference to Critias as "the greatest hater of the people (or, of democracy,
8

7/ho10TaTo) " 8 was not made by Xenophon originally, as Wolf infers, but
rather by Polycrates in his KaTnqyopCa l
jpd'ovs, and merely reported by

,Go-

Xenophon. 9 In the opinion of the reviewer, the whole of Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.2.9-61 is but a restatement and rebuttal of some of Polycrates' charges
and allegations which he had launched against Socrates in his Karrlyopta
%wJaKpd'Tovq. The

KaT7yopog

of Memorabilia 1.2.9-61 is not Anytus, Meletus,

or Lycon, but Polycrates, as may also be gathered from Libanius' Apologia
Socratis.lO
Perhaps the definition of law which, according to Aristotle, Politics 1280 b 11,
was proposed by Lycophron, could liberally be translated as follows: "Law
is a body of agreed upon but nevertheless authoritative grounds of and
guides to actual decisions in controversies, which grounds or guides serve as a
kind of social guarantee (and social control) through which men mutually
delimit and secure to one another certain rights (or interests) which by tradition
or convention have been recognized as pertaining to the nature of man."
The Anonymus Jamblichi, which in all likelihood constitutes the transition
from Sophistic individualism to Plato's legal and political theory (an investigation of the extent to which Plato was familiar with the Anonymus Jamblichi
would make an interesting study), may be called the most important and
certainly the profoundest pre-Platonic work on legal theory. Wolf's exposition
and discussion of this unknown author is, indeed, a brilliant piece of work,
especially his observation that Anonymus Jamblichi seems to overcome the
possibly disastrous antinomy of v4pog and OJno-t by stressing the sovereignty of
the law-abiding citizenry. On the other hand, the reviewer is a little startled to
find Antiphon of Rhamnus listed among the "democratic Sophists." To say that
Antiphon wished to re-establish a democratic politeia shaped after the ideals of
Solon and Pericles seems to ignore the fact that the oligarchic reaction of 411
B.C., in which Antiphon apparently played a major role, intended to return to
the "Constitution of Draco" or, as we would say, to the political ideals of the
8.
9.

10.

2
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cit. at 129.
1.2.12.

Cf. Chroust, Xenophon, Polycrates and 'The Indictment of Socrates,' 16
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"Founding Fathers" (this becomes evident in Antiphon's advocacy of a "return
to the original natural community"), rather than to that of Solon whom the
oligarchs of 411 apparently considered "the first of the democratic demagogues."
And certainly Antiphon had no use for a Pericles and his democratic reforms.
On page 151 11 the author is guilty of an obvious anachronism when he states
that Antiphon did not wish to bring about "civic unity" by means of force,
because he knew from experience that after their dismal experiences with the reign
of the Thirty Tyrants the Athenians were strongly opposed to any kind of rv'pavvT
(incidentally, ' pavvt is misspelled). Antiphon, together with Archeptolemus,
was executed in 411 B.C., presumably for his participation in the oligarchic
revolution, while the reign of the Thirty Tyrants lasted from c. September, 404,
to May, 403.
The reviewer concurs, on the whole, with those scholars who see in the
"philosopher Socrates" primarily the product of fanciful Socratics-who in the
diversity of their literary and artistic talents as well as in the variety of their
philosophical inclinations have tried to erect a literary Socrates legend of manifold
forms, all of which are as intangible as they are elusive. Every Socratic, barring
those instances where they borrowed from one another or from a common source,
seems to have created his own brand of Socrates or Socratic philosophy. In
the course of time this practice necessarily led to a great diversity of alleged
"Socratic philosophies" or "Socratic schools," each claiming to render the only
accurate account of Socrates and his teachings. But whatever each of these
Socratics offers as the alleged true philosophy of Socrates probably is nothing
other than the peculiar kind of philosophy advanced by this Socratic himself.
This would explain why Socrates was for Plato a sublime ideal, for Antisthenes
a model which called for imitation, and for Xenophon a pedagogical pattern.
In sum, Socrates has become "all things to all men" or, better, "all philosophies
to all philosophers." The seriously conflicting sources about Socrates should
bear this out fully.' 2
Wolf seems to overlook the fact that in all likelihood the Xenophontean
Socrates is strongly influenced by the teachings of Antisthenes, and that Plato's
Apology, as has already been stated, is probably an imitation of Gorgias' Defence
of Palamedes. In any event, the similarities between the Platonic and the
Gorgian apologies are too many and too great to be accidental. Also, the author
pays no attention to the effects which Polycrates' KaT7yopia %wKpaTovq had

upon the whole Socrates tradition. It is the contention of the reviewer that this
Polycratean pamphlet, which was published between 392 and 390 B.C., is
the true cause of the apologetic furor which gripped some of the Socratics,
but apparently not Antisthenes. Xenophon, in Memorabilia 1.2.9-61, displays
his thorough acquaintance with some of the charges contained in the Polycratean
pamphlet. It is in Memorabilia 1.2.9-61 that he attempts to rebut and disprove
them. Plato's Crito, the reviewer believes, is likewise an indirect rebuttal of
Polycrates (and hence apologetic in nature), who had charged Socrates with
11.
12.

Vol. 2.
On page 10, vol. 3 (Bibliography on Socrates), the reference should read: F. M.

Cornford, rather than Conford.
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having despised the legal and political institutions of democratic Athens and,
incidentally, with having worked towards the overthrow of Athenian democracy.
In the Crito Plato answers Polycrates (whom he never mentions, however)
by creating the fiction that Socrates was the most law-abiding citizen, even "unto
death." This characterization, however, ill befits a man who apparently was
closely associated with such men as Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, and
Adeimantus.
Unfortunately, due to the desperate source situation, little is known about
Antisthenes. But whatever we may glean from the surviving tradition often
seems to be rather attractive, especially his bland glorification of honest work,
be it manual or intellectual. From such a prophet of the dignity of conscientious
work we might expect interesting and perhaps appealing views on law and justice.
It should also be borne in mind that Antisthenes and his ideas probably influenced
some of the legal notions of the Stoics. Tradition, it appears, also ascribed to
Socrates many traits and views which in all likelihood were Antisthenean. That
Xenophon's Cyropaedia is strongly under the influence of Antisthenes and
Antisthenean pedagogical notions, needs no special comment. Suffice it here to
point out that Cynic "hero worship," aside from Hercules, also included King
Cyrus about whom, according to Diogenes Laertius, Antisthenes wrote several
works with which Xenophon apparently was acquainted.
Xenophon's notorious unreliability as a Socratic reporter or, for that matter,
as a reporter in general, be it about Greek history or his exploits during the
famous Retreat, is too well known to deserve comment. But did Xenophon
really intend to write a historico-biographical report on Socrates? Or did he
compose his Socratica merely in order to propagate, in the name of Socrates,
his own ideas? Is it not true that the Socratic conversations recorded by Xenophon are for the most part, if not all, nothing more than vehicles of Xenophon's
well-known fondness for displaying his literary gifts or for advancing his personal
convictions, philosophy of life, and his notions about a great many things in
general? To cite but a few examples: the lengthy and seemingly quite competent
discourses on the duties and qualifications of a good military commander or
cavalry general, as well as the statements on military strategy or tactics in general
with which Xenophon credits Socrates, are as fanciful, not to say fictitious, as
are the discussions on national economy or politics likewise ascribed to Socrates.
Xenophon the economist, planter, strategist, dog-breeder, huntsman, soldier,
historiographer-in short, Xenophon the "Jack-of-all-trades" and the man of
many interests-during his long and adventurous life became acquainted with
a great variety of tasks connected with practical life. But this does not entitle
him to impute the same interests to Socrates. And what could a Xenophon
possibly tell us about the law of the Greek city, about civic virtues and about
Greek legal thought, about civic-mindedness and legal justice-he who was
perhaps the perfect type of that ancient Greek who in his complete detachment
from his native city Athens was apparently quite devoid of all sentiments of
loyalty and a deeper commitment to the laws of Athens? He abandoned Athens
in the hour of her greatest need and most dire prostration in order to gain some
superficial notoriety (and considerable plunder) with a band of countryless and
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lawless adventurers who became lost somewhere in the heart of Persia when
the treasonable designs of Cyrus the Younger came to a sudden end at Cunaxa.
He definitely exaggerated, to say the least, about the role he played in the famous
Retreat. After his return to Europe he felt no scruples, Athenian though he was,
to fight against Athens and her allies on the side of his Spartan friend and
idol, King Agesilaus. Disappointed and exiled (probably for his treasonable
conduct), he retired to a beautiful country estate in Elis, to enjoy the fruits of
his plunder as a mediocre literatus and hunting squire, steeped in piety. Fascinating, however, is Professor Wolf's statement that the Xenophontean Cyropaedia
is a sort of "Fiirstenspiegel" (Mirror of Princes), full of Machiavellian ideas;
or his observation that unlike Plato, Xenophon realized the necessity and perhaps
even the coming of large political organizations and empires. And as in the
case of Caesar's "Reichsgedanken," such empires stand in need of different laws
than the old Greek city. Like Thucydides, but for different reasons, Xenophon
holds that the traditional city-state had outlived its usefulness.
Xenophon's Defence of Socrates before his Judges, it appears, was primarily
composed to "correct" what others already had written about the trial and
death of Socrates. It is quite possible that Xenophon had in mind here the
Apology of Plato and perhaps other Socratic apologies no longer extant. Internal
evidence suggests that the Defence was composed some time after 385 or 384
B.C. Since this work was designed primarily to portray and extol the proud and
inflexible conduct of Socrates before his judges, it is not really an account of
what transpired during the trial, but rather a testimonial of Socrates' loftiness
and, hence, as Jaeger maintains, a sort of "appendix" to the Memorabilia.
Jaeger's opinion, however, at least in the form in which it is stated, is open to
challenge. The Defence may well be called an appendix to Memorabilia 1.1.1.1.2.64, which, as has already been shown, was originally an independent essay or
Socratic Apology; but it cannot be called an appendix to the whole of the
Xenophontean Memorabilia, and this for the simple reason that Memorabilia
1.3.1 ff. in all likelihood were written after the Defence of Socrates before his
Judges.13 For this reviewer holds that the chronological sequence of these three
works is the following: Memorabilia 1.1.1-1.2.64, Defence, and Memorabilia
1.3.1-4.8.11.
He maintains that Defence, chap. 20, is dependent on
Memorabilia 1.2.49 (Defence 20 is a summary of Memorabilia 1.2.49);
and that Memorabilia 1.2.49, like the whole of Memorabilia 1.2.9-61, was
stimulated by the publication of Polycrates' KanTyopfa %Ca)KpCL~ovs between

392 and 390 B.C.
The Wasps, Knights, Acharnians, and Clouds of Aristophanes are, among
other things, also classical parodies of the activities of the legal profession or
the professional advocate in Athens. Apparently these parodies reflect the
public sentiment against the "professional lawyer"; and they contain bitter
13. The reviewer bases his assumption that Memorabilia 1.3.1 ff. is later than the Defence
on the fact that in Memorabilia 3.5.1-28 Socrates discusses with Pericles the Younger means
and ways as to how Athens may be restored to her former greatness. The general background of this discussion is definitely the political situation which existed in Greece between
the battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) and the battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.). Xenophon, it is
surmised, died not too long after 360 B.C.
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complaints of the older men against the brash young advocates who are said to
be extremely skilled in the use of hair-splitting dialectics in order to make "the
straight crooked and the crooked straight." The new "lawyer's law," which is
not always above reproach, is unfavorably compared with the allegedly honest
ways of old. Generalizing from certain instances of reprehensible behavior among
lawyers, Aristophanes turned his wrath upon the whole profession, proving
thereby only that at all times and in all places the alleged depravity of advocates
and lawyers is, and always has been, an undying subject for sweeping criticism
and a perpetual topic for fanciful satires.
In turning to another part of literature, it may be said that poetry, especially
epic poetry, places the main emphasis upon the individual rather than the event;
it deals with man (and his heroic deeds) rather than with institutions. In
Greek cultural history we encounter a singular phenomenon which is indicative
of the power which the Homeric epics had over the minds and hearts of the
Greeks: long after the Greeks had developed rather advanced and complex social
as well as political structures, that is, long after they became keenly alert to the
political and social problems of their time (although on the whole they failed
to solve them adequately), they were still completely satisfied with what Homer
and other poets had to tell them about their own past. Homer was, to put it
epigrammatically, their past. Tradition has it that Herodotus was the "first
historian," but Herodotus came rather late. When the "Father of History"
wrote his tales (certainly naive at times), Pericles had already spoken about
the ideals of Greek political and democratic life, Aeschylus and Sophocles had
composed their stirring tragedies, and such men as Solon, Cleisthenes, and
Ephialtes had carried out their far-reaching social reforms.
The Greek term for "history" originally meant something like "inquiry";
and the word "historian," at least according to Homer, Iliad 22.486, meant
someone who, because he is an "inquirer" into old customs and traditions, acts
as an "arbitrator" in controversies in that he can get at what is "right" in a
particular case. Judging from a fragment ascribed to Heraclitus of Ephesus,
the term "historian" apparently refers to a person who looks realistically at the
facts of experience rather than philosophizes about them. It should also be
borne in mind that Aristotle's Natural History still retains this particular meaning;
Aristotle does not philosophize or speculate here about the genesis of the physical
world, but rather proposes to establish certain facts of experience. This transition
from myth (or philosophy) to fact also affected Herodotus' attitude towards
"law," although occasionally he still philosophizes about "cosmic justice" when
he discusses, for instance, the intermeshed consequences of the rape of Io, Europa,
Medea, and Helen. Here, too, mysterious powers are at work. If we compare
Hecataeus and Herodotus, we must also realize that between these two "historians" stood an event of the first magnitude and prime historical importance:
the Pan-Hellenic war with Persia. This event alone did much to shake the
Greek out of that spirit of complacency which once upon a time had sworn by
Homer's myths or had insisted on fanciful genealogies.
The originality of Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, as compared with the
History of Herodotus, lies in the fact that Thucydides tries scrupulously to avoid
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the products of poetic imagination. Hence he might be called the "Father"
of intelligently pragmatic historiography, centering attention on facts, likely
motives and possible purposes which apparently became manifest in actions or
facts. Possibly under the influence of Sophistic teachings, he turned into a
"sociologist" rather than an "ethicist." Nevertheless, as may be gathered, for
instance, from 5.105.2, there exists something like a mysterious and inexorable
"necessity" which intertwines human action and reaction, cause and effect,
intentions and results, conduct and reward. But this "necessity," in a way,
always remains incomprehensible. At the same time Thucydides the "sociologist"
is also a "moralist": justice, which to him means probably that which is every
one's due, is more than mere expediency. Expediency devoid of justice can turn
into a highroad to disaster. Wolf correctly maintains that the terms voot,
Kawov, and "Ta 8&KmuZ," have with Thucydides a traditional as
" n .. L'7,
well as a novel meaning which might go back to Sophistic influences; and, that
according to Thucydides, war, this "schoolmaster of violence," has a deteriorating
effect upon all values and the sense of value, including the sense for justice and
moral restraint, by ushering in the crudest forms of pragmatism. And finally,
Wolf's discussion and analysis of the Melian episode in its profounder moral and
legal implications is simply superb. It is, to use a well-worn phrase, a liberal
education in itself.
But the reviewer suspects that Wolf is far too idealistic and, certainly, far
too philosophical about the Greek rhetoricians, particularly the forensic orators,
and about their contributions (or lack of contributions) to Greek legal thought.
In order to prove his point, the reviewer, who is a lawyer interested in the history
and achievements of the legal profession, wishes to launch into a rather lengthy
and somewhat detailed discussion of these orators, their origin, their function,
their activities and, especially, their attitude towards the law and the administration of justice. Needless to say, these observations are to a large extent in the
nature of supplementary remarks.
Greek (Athenian) rhetoric, especially forensic oratory (which made up an essential part of Greek rhetoric), in the opinion of the reviewer was determined to
a large extent by the peculiar administration of justice which prevailed in Athens
during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The heliastic courts, which were an
expression of the absolute judicial sovereignty of the Athenian people, were bound
by no particular technical rule of law or procedure. Each Athenian court was
supreme: it could interpret, apply, or ignore any law it saw fit. In addition,
some laws were not only ambiguous, but even contradictory. Also, since the
courts were not bound by any precedent, each court was at liberty to ignore
completely its own previous decisions. It must also be borne in mind that the
average Athenian citizen, when performing his heliastic duties, was constantly
showered with compliments by fawning litigants or defendants and their "lawyers"
(the forensic orators). Abject though calculated adulation rained upon him
so incessantly that his susceptible imagination soon began to believe what his
flatterers told him, namely, that he was an infallible god. The spoiled and fickle
will of the sovereign Athenian heliast, although it was often as irresponsible as
its decrees were irreversible, really knew no bounds, restraints, or discipline.
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Even in his best of moods the Athenian sat in court with a disposition too much
like that with which he took his seat in the theater when he settled down to compare, discuss, applaud or "boo" the literary merits of the various compositions submitted to his judgment by rival poets. On occasions he did not hesitate to inflict a
heavy fine or decree total confiscation of a man's property on the sole ground that
the treasury was empty and had to be replenished so as to be able to pay his
"salary." Nearly always he failed to distinguish between law and fact, fact and
fiction; and the reasons for many of his purely emotional decisions were often
known not even to himself.
As the new heliastic courts developed, the old and rather burdensome rule
requiring every litigant or defendant to plead his own case was relaxed to the
extent of permitting him to secure assistance in the presentation of his cause.
Such assistance took one of three forms: first, a litigant or defendant refrained
from speaking at all and had someone else-the synegoros or, perhaps more
correctly, the hyperapologoumenos-speak in his behalf; or, secondly, he spoke
for himself and at the conclusion of his speech had some one else-the syndicspeak for him; or, thirdly, he delivered a memorized speech written for him by
a "speech-writer"-the logographos, or logographer.
Undoubtedly, a good logographer was of great if not decisive help to a
litigant or defendant. The heliastic courts acted under the principle that every
citizen should have a personal hearing before his assembled peers and, hence,
liked, nay demanded, to see him stand up for himself. Nothing could serve
the interest of the litigant or defendant so well as a brilliant speech delivered in
person. Not many persons, however, were equal to this exacting task, especially
since the heliasts-who often considered a trial a kind of "oratorical contest," a
"spectacle" rather than a serious discussion of evidence, facts, and the law
applicable to these facts-were extremely critical of such oratorical performances.
To meet this particular situation there appeared during the latter part of
the fifth century B.C. that interesting figure in Athenian public life who was
called the logographer. This "speech-writer," as has been shown, prepared the
address which the litigant or defendant memorized and then, during the trial,
delivered before the court. By retaining a logographer the litigant also preserved
the appearance of speaking for himself extemporaneously, something which
always impressed the heliasts. Forensic speech-writing soon became an essential
part of general rhetoric, which subsequently was subdivided into epideictic,
deliberative, and forensic oratory. This latter fact alone should be ample indication of the importance which forensic oratory and forensic speech-writing
attained within a relatively short period of time: it was soon considered the
equal of epideictic and of deliberative rhetoric, and a goodly number of the
most famous ancient orations which have come down to us and are still considered
masterpieces of classical rhetoric, are simply forensic speeches either delivered
by the author himself or prepared for delivery by some "client" involved in
litigation. Forensic speech-writing, in other words, became the occupation of
nearly every outstanding Athenian rhetorician.
Obviously, the logographer-and we are mostly concerned here with the
forensic logographer-had to do more than merely compose a speech to be
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recited by his clients in court. He had to be familiar, at least in a superficial
way, with law and procedure, the more so, since, then as now, an adversary
was always ready to take advantage of a false legal step, including even a
grammatical error or a faulty pronunciation. Thus also in matters of citation,
interpretation, or application of the law, the assistance of an "expert" was
well-nigh indispensable. Ignorance of the law, a wrong citation, or an oratorical
deficiency could and often did have disastrous consequences for a litigant or
defendant.
Since the logographer was compelled to furnish his client with a finished
product that did not admit of any changes once it was in the hands of the client,
the speech-writer had also to anticipate, as far as possible, the arguments and
counter-arguments of the adversary. For a person who, on account of his ineptitude or timidity had to have his speech "ghost-written" by a logographer, could
hardly be expected, and would scarcely dare, to alter the speech by making
changes in order to meet unexpected arguments of the opposing side. Hence
correct prediction and skillful anticipation of the opposing arguments could
determine the outcome of the controversy.
One of the astonishing features of Athenian public opinion was its pronounced
dislike of "professional lawyers." This aversion, it may be assumed, was probably
related to the general mistrust of all expert or skilled persons. The Athenian
people, it seems, held to the fallacious belief that by his expertness a man became
part of an "undemocratic elite" and thus set himself apart from and, hence,
against the "average man" who made up the "ideal" democratic community.
The fate of Antiphon of Rhamnus, according to tradition the most outstanding
and successful "lawyer" of his time, furnishes a telling example of this Athenian
aversion to the expert. As a result of this widespread popular attitude, "lawyers"
-and the reviewer considers the forensic orator and logographer the Athenian
version of the modem lawyer-were always on the defense, justifying their
appearance in court by claiming to be either a "friend" or a "remote relative"
of the client. Such fictions, often brazenly untrue, were a constant feature in
Athenian trials. As an additional justification for his appearance the "lawyer"
could always make the unusual plea that he did so because he was a personal
enemy of the adversary. Thus when Demosthenes defended Ctesiphon, it
becomes quite obvious that he was actually defending himself against his personal
enemy and antagonist Aeschines.
The general dislike of the professional "lawyer" also prevented the forensic
orator from being recognized as an expert on the law. He was rarely permitted
to speak as an expert to the court on any point of law. In consequence, and
Wolf seems to overlook this important fact, the forensic orator often was most
reluctant to display publicly any knowledge of the law (provided he had any),
lest he be suspected of being a "professional man" and thus incur the animadversion of the court. Hence he always wished to appear as a plain, ordinary
citizen. Whenever he cited a law, decree, statute, or ordinance in court, he
usually quoted it in his own words, often distorting, omitting, or de-emphasizing
whatever was not in his favor. The same holds true as regards his declamations
about law and justice in general. These rather nonchalant references to law and
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justice as well as tainted citations are a rather poor basis for establishing the
"legal thought" of the time, especially since these "lawyers" allowed themselves
much, and perhaps too much, latitude in the way of omission, interpretation, or
plain adulteration. To quote here but one famous example: Aristotle himself
suggests to the forensic orator that whenever the "written law" should be unfavorable to a "lawyer's" cause, he ought to appeal to the "unwritten law," and vice
versa. Hence, judging solely from some of the forensic orators and their attitude
towards the law, the law just happened to be whatever served their particular
cause; and the peculiar "Rechtsdenken" of these men consisted primarily in
their burning desire to win a particular case at all costs.
The activities of an Athenian "lawyer" in court ranged all the way from a
careful though often seriously distorted and highly colored discussion of the
facts and a more or less competent analysis of the law in relation to the facts,
to mere bombastic oratory and platitudinous, and even theatrical, appeals to
emotion and sentiment. In order to gain the sympathy of the heliasts, the
litigant or defendant, who in this had previously been prompted by his "lawyer,"
would often begin by contending that the allegations or charges against him were
"gross injustice," "outright lies," or "contrary to law." Then he would contrast
his own lack of forensic ability, rhetorical fluency, and experience with the
cunning, eloquence, and experience of his adversary, who was often referred
to as a despicable "professional" or a detestable "sycophant." Whenever possible,
he would also refer to his alleged poverty, advanced age, physical infirmities or
perhaps to some service he once had rendered the city.' 4 Having thus established himself as the sorry "underdog" who properly trembled before his mighty but
certainly vicious antagonist, the litigant or defendant would then "courageously"
resolve that, despite this "crushing inequality of odds," he would join the issue,
knowing that the "righteousness of his cause" would ultimately triumph, particularly since the "enlightened" and "fair" gentlemen of the "jury" could not
possibly fail to see the "obvious justice" of his case. Such were the stereotyped
commonplaces which abounded in the forensic speeches of the time.
A final problem connected with the "Rechtsdenken" of the Greek orators,
especially the forensic orators, is the following: the sovereign people of Athens
were not only the supreme judges in all matters brought before their tribunal,
but, in keeping with their absolute sovereignty, they also had the sole power to
pardon in all criminal matters. The Athenians apparently did not see the basic
difference that exists between a court of justice and a board of pardon. In
consequence, the functions of judging and those of pardoning were as a rule
practiced in unison. This fact should also explain why the "lawyers" (or the
defendant who had previously been prompted by the "lawyer") so often tried
to arouse and enlist the sympathies (or wrath) of the heliasts through all sorts of
passionate and dramatic appeals and theatrics. This is also the reason why so
many piteous appeals to compassion were made by lawyers for their clients, and
why such touching pictures were drawn of the miseries attending a conviction:
in criminal proceedings the lawyer would parade before the court the defendant
14. It might be interesting to note here that, at least according to Plato, Socrates, when
on trial for his life, flatly refused to resort to such practices.
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dressed in rags, uncombed, unshaven, and haggard-the abject picture of a man
who had suffered the punishment of exile; he would produce the defendant's
weeping wife, dressed like a widow in mourning, and his wailing children who
would desperately cling to their distraught father (if the man had no children,
he could always hire them for the occasion) -an effective way of warding off, a
possible capital sentence. All these heart-rending theatrics, of course, had been
carefully rehearsed in advance. Also, a "lawyer" who had once rendered some
negligible service to the city would not hesitate to ask for a favorable verdict or
an acquittal for his client as a public recognition for these services.
Since the Athenian heliasts, as has already been stated, often came to court
in order to be entertained by dramatic displays, it was the prime task of any
"lawyer" who strove for success to entertain and amuse his "jury-audience"
properly, often by using the same means a public entertainer would employ.
This should also explain the widespread use of slanderous invectives and personal
abuse of the adversary-an important and certainly effective feature of Athenian
"legal practice." In open court Demosthenes, to recite just one instance, called
Meidias such galling names as cur, rogue, wretch, villain, blackguard, bully,
miscreant, and coward. Demosthenes himself furnishes an explanation for this
deplorable practice when he observes that the Athenian courts enjoy listening
to abusive language and vile expressions. Since the pleasure of the all-powerful
heliasts was of a decisive nature, it is not surprising that many of the forensic
orations should abound with a virulence of abuse. Disgraceful epithets were
passed back and forth with monotonous lavishness, while the heliastic audience,
we must assume, rocked in their seats with laughter, applauding a particularly
nasty but clever insult, and constantly calling for more of the same. Such
reactions, akin to the effects which a particularly brutal boxing match has upon
an inflamed mob-audience, practically compelled a "lawyer" who wished for a
favorable verdict, to stoop to vile and repulsive practices.
But enough of this rather unpleasant picture, which has been drawn from
life merely to indicate that the reviewer is unable to share Wolf's somewhat
idealistic views about the "Rechtsdenken" of the Greek orators. There is,
however, one general and final observation which the reviewer wishes to make
here: the particular judicial system at Athens, where there was no such thing
as regular courts manned by trained law men or a regular procedure or perhaps
a consistent body of laws, was not exactly conducive to either an efficient
administration of justice, or to the development of a distinct class of highminded and well-trained lawyers who displayed a profound sense of real justice,
or, perhaps, a sense of high professional standards. To make matters worse,
for a long period of time Athens, for reasons already stated, seems to have
displayed a marked distrust and dislike of the professional (trained and skilled)
lawyer, and a definite aversion to all forms of legal expertness. By taking this
deplorable attitude Athens probably denied itself a chance of developing a class
of lawyer-jurists comparable in fame and attainment to the great Roman jurisconsults and jurists. The general and unwarranted rejection of the lawyer as a
professional man, it may be added here, had far-reaching and, perhaps catastrophic consequences: it deprived Greece of a chance of becoming the lasting
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lawgiver of Western mankind. This failure is the more regrettable since the
Greek people, as their philosophical and artistic achievements have so clearly
shown, were by nature and disposition eminently qualified and perhaps even
destined to approach the complex problems of the law with unrivalled intelligence
and profound understanding of the essential. At this point one may give reign
to the imagination and ponder over the problem of what might have happened
if during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the Greeks had competently and
sympathetically tackled law from the point of view of the lawyer-jurist. Unlike
the rather unimaginative Romans, who saw in the law primarily a technical
adjustment of certain aspects of human relations, the Greeks, true to their
proclivity for ultimate synthesis, intellectual balance, and profounder insights,
fully understood and intelligently knew how to avoid, at least in some of their
philosophical discussions, the dangers inherent in that vexing and subsequently
never completely resolved "dualism" of law and morals which ever since has
plagued us. To them law and morals (and perhaps the Greeks did not know
law in the sense we use it today), private morality, and social ethics were
essentially one and the same thing: the law-abiding citizen was the morally
virtuous man who in all his actions deported himself as the thoughtful member
of a greater community, fully conscious of the essential identity of law, morals,
and the common good.
It is, indeed, sad to reflect upon the possibility of a more satisfying and more
satisfactory jurisprudence that might have resulted for the whole of the Western
world if the Greeks, and not the Romans, had attained to that special legal excellence which forever will be connected with the Roman law. It is even sadder
to reflect upon the fact that, in the final analysis, it was silly prejudice and
untimely pettiness (the popular aversion to the professional lawyer and jurist)
which prevented the Greeks, a people so fortuitously endowed by nature and so
uniquely placed in such choice circumstances, from becoming the immortal
lawyer-jurists and lawgivers they were perhaps destined to be. But such are the
real tragedies of history.
To review and, at the same time, to do full justice to a work of such magnitude and such magnificence is no easy task. Of necessity the reviewer has had
to confine himself to the role of an eclectic or, perhaps, casual causeur. The
mere fact that this review, if one may call it so, is both lengthy and occasionally
searching, should indicate beyond all doubt that Professor Wolf's work is a monumental achievement. The various observations (and digressions) offered in this
review are appropriate only to an accomplishment of more than ordinary significance. The inclusiveness of Wolf's enterprise--four volumes containing 1697
pages-is bound to contain elements which will elicit some disagreement,
especially in matters of interpretation, interpolation, and emphasis. The title
of the work alone suggests a most ambitious undertaking, and the vastness of
its content approaches the dimension of an encyclopaedia. At the same time,
the learning and scholarship of its author are simply astounding. In short, Wolf's
Griechisches Rechtsdenken is in itself more than a liberal education; it is a
universal human experience. The author's art as well as his flowing presentation
has in itself a Hellenic quality which from time to time brings a deep sense of
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pleasure: all the main qualities of truly Hellenic thought are there, the living
symmetry of form, the grace and delicacy of detail, and the occasional fantasy
enlivening a fundamentally grave problem. No matter what one may think of
Wolf's basic commitment to the thought and nomenclature of Heidegger, his
work is, and always will be, an outstanding and, probably, the most outstanding
contribution to the diversified and difficult field of Greek legal thought, which no
earnest student of jurisprudence, philosophy, history, sociology, or the classics
can afford to ignore. Not only has the author established a standard of scholarship for others to admire and imitate, but his work is, as the present reviewer
has stated in his introductory remarks, one of those excellent and rare accomplishmerits which it is almost an impossibility to review, and almost an impertinence
to praise or criticize.
ANTON-HERMANN

DAs

CHROUST

By Hans
Thieme. Juristische Fakultit der Universit5t Basel, Institut ffir Internationales Recht und Internationale Beziehungen. Schriftenreihe Heft 6.
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 1954. Pp. 54. Fr. 6.25.

NATURRECHT UND DIE EUROPXISCHE PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE.

Taking his cue from Leibniz' Basis juris socialis inter genres ipsum naturae
jus est (the basis of the social law among nations is the natural law itself), Professor Thieme discusses the origin and development of natural law in order to
promote the science of law and to contribute effectively to the renascence of
natural law thinking in our time.
Though nations are now largely isolated from one another in the matter of
law, this has not always been so. Efforts have been made to overcome this
pernicious isolation as, for example, with the Roman law in ancient times, the
canon law during the Middle Ages, and the various systems of natural law in
modern times. Of all these systems, the most universal in scope and content
was, and still is, the natural law. Pufendorf made this clear in the statement:
Haec disciplina non solos Christianos sed universum mortalium gens spectet
(This subject [the natural law] affects not only Christians but the whole of
mankind). Roman law largely vanished with the ancient world, and the unity
of canon law was impaired by the Reformation. Though the Renaissance
revivified the Roman law, it was no longer universally accepted. Thus the science
of law, left without guidance, became stagnant; and the vacuum created by
the absence of universally valid and accepted legal principles was filled by
natural law. Hence, according to Thieme, if we wish nowadays to overcome
the isolationist features of contemporary national laws, we will have to return
to the principles of natural law.
Hugo Grotius has been credited with being the originator of modem secular
natural law. We are not interested here so much in his De jure beii et pacis
as in his Inleinding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid (Introduction to the
Jurisprudence of the Netherlands). This book, which still constitutes a source
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of law in the South African Union, is as important as his main work on The
Laws of War and Peace. Until Grotius, there had been remarkable divergences
in the science of law as it was taught at continental universities, or as it was
interpreted and applied by the several courts in various countries. It is the lasting
achievement of Grotius to have welded elements of natural law, Roman law, and
Dutch law into a single, original independent system of private law which
reflected the living legal realities of his native country. Why, then, is this work
so important, and why was Grotius able to create this kind of work? First of
all, in writing this work, Grotius used his wide knowledge as a historian, philologist, and scholarly lawyer as well as his experiences as a practicing attorney.
He was thoroughly familiar with the Dutch law and its sources, as well as with
the decisions handed down by the superior courts in Germany and France.
Secondly, he injected ideas of natural law into the private law. Until Grotius,
these ideas for the most part had been nebulous and purely speculative. But
he made them important in practical jurisprudence by projecting them against
concrete legal problems, and by using them as a means of clarifying and streamlining the positive law. Thus Grotius also became the founder of modem
classification and systematizing of private law on the Continent. His Introduction
to the Jurisprudenceof the Netherlands,for instance, introduced such subdivisions
as "On Law and Justice," "Species and the Effects of Legal Norms," "Marriage
Law," "Property," and "Community Property." Finally, by introducing the
ideas of natural law into the law of the land, Grotius not only established
working criteria for the validity of the coerciveness found in every law, but he
also was able to point out the basis for the creation of new laws. He taught,
in short, how to reason about the law, de lege ferenda. Hitherto the only legal
arguments in use were those of traditional interpretation or the usages and
practices of the courts. Grotius, however, taught a more liberal and progressive
approach to law. Time and again he sought the social purpose which the law
serves.
Thieme notes three characteristic features which make for the unity of
modern natural law. First, and paramount, the unity in the method of reasoning
-in this instance, the so-called mathematical or geometrical method-whereby
truth is arrived at by consistent and logical reasoning and argumentation.
Secondly, 'the unity of language-Latin is replaced by French, the language of
diplomacy and of the law of nations. (The basic works compiled by the teachers
of natural law were translated into French and soon became the most popular
manuals known over the whole of Europe, especially in France, England, Sweden,
and Switzerland. They crossed the Atlantic and became popular manuals in
the Colonies and the young republic.) And, finally, the common social ideals
of the time.
Three -types of writers, according to Thieme, were influential in expounding
the natural law: the systematists, the analysts (or critics), and the synthetists.
The German systematists-Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Wolff-following
in the footsteps of Grotius, in a way are the creators of the modem systems of
private law. Pufendorf, treating all domains of private law, rearranges the
traditional materials-he starts with the individual by way of the law of contracts,
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property, succession, and domestic relations; and then proceeds to the law
governing states and nations. In this manner he paves the way to modem
codification. In the earlier systems of natural law the argument in favor of
de lege ferenda is rather cautious and even timid: what is traditional or authoritative is at times still preferred to the thoroughly reasonable. Thus, many norms
and institutions are upheld and justified, not by reason, but simply because they
were traditionally accepted or customarily observed.
Jean Domat, the author of Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel (16891694), was a French legal writer of deeply religious convictions who displays
in his work the influences of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Suarez, Calvin,
and Grotius. The famous French critic, Boileau, called Domat "the man who
restored reason to jurisprudence." As a man of faith, Domat developed a whole
system of law from the Christian norm of brotherly love. By reducing the
positive law to certain fundamental natural law principles, he indicated the
manner of overcoming positive law whenever the latter conflicts with these
basic principles. His role in the history of law is similar to that of Pufendorf.
He paved the way for the so-called "General Part" of the Pandects and the
subsequent codifications of the French law. Even more than the famous Pothier,
he influenced the future French Civil Code.
Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) similarly based his works on "universal
concepts." He considered from every point of view "la loi naturelle, les donnJes
de la conscience, les objections du for intirieur." Recent studies have demonstrated that the effects of this kind of natural law thinking have been more
important in France than was previously conceded. The result of this insight
was that jurists became, on the whole, accustomed to place reason above tradition,
and to oppose authority with free inquiry.
The significance of the French school of natural law, however, lies rather
with the analytical approach. The leading French systematists, such as Helvetius,
Mably, Morelly, Voltaire, and Rousseau, Who derived little inspiration from
the analysts, were mostly under the influence of the English social philosophers
and of Grotius and the German natural law philosophers. Their significance
went beyond the territorial boundaries of France.
The second or critical phase of natural law doctrine was principally French.
The political developments of the period during which the French natural law
philosophers published their writings caused their ideas to spread throughout
Europe. In France proper they prepared the way for the French Revolution
as well as inaugurated important legislative reforms touching on the law of
persons, domestic relations, hereditary succession, and real property. The influences of these reforms could be felt in the remotest corners of Europe.
In England an old natural law tradition extends from canon law and
Scholastic thinking (through Fortescue and Christopher St. Germain) to such
authors as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, Richard Cumberland and William
Blackstone. In John Fortescue's De natura legis naturalis (1461-63) natural
law is treated as an intermediary between the superior but undetermined divine
law and the inferior but determined human law-a point of view which is quite
similar to that held by St, Thomas Aquinas. Natural law is the criterion of
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human law, and the errors in the King's law are to be corrected in the light
of natural law.
Christopher St. Germain's Doctor and Student (1523-32) was the most
popular manual of equity until the time of Blackstone. This work stressed the
great importance of natural law and identified it with the law of reason. Positive
law must conform to natural law or else be regarded as an abuse of law.
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) in a way are
closely related to contemporary Continental jurisprudence and to the ideas of
natural law writers from Grotius to the popular Swiss author Burlamaqui. Time
and again Blackstone considers the law not only as a matter of practice, but
also as a rational science; he constantly refers to natural rights, natural obligations, and natural justice. Nowhere is there more evidence than in his Commentaries of the formative and systematic power of natural law: Nirgends zeigt
sich deutlicher als bei Blackstone die systembildende Kraft des Naturrechts.1
Thus, though Blackstone bases -hiswritings not on the Roman law tradition but
on the common law of England, 'he definitely belongs, together with Pufendorf
and Wolff, Domat and Pothier, to the group of systematists. And although he
is conservative and traditionalist in his views, time and again he resorts to natural
law reasoning in order to bring the English common law of the time in line with
the two idols of the eighteenth century, Reason and Nature. Before the American
Revolution 2500 copies of the Commentaries are said to have crossed the Atlantic
and helped to spread the message of the natural law doctrine in America.
In England the systematic Commentaries were followed by the analytical
school. An outstanding representative of this school of natural law is Jeremy
Bentham, the great critic of Blackstone and author of the Comment on the
Commentaries (1774-75).
Bentham takes issue with Blackstone's conservatism
and endeavors to mitigate some of the harsh provisions of contemporary English
law.
The great traditions of natural law had persistently become manifest in the
decisions and traditions of English common law courts and the court of Chancery.
One aspect of that tradition was the constant appeal to the test of reason to
which the validity and binding force of law and custom were subjected. This
concept of reason included both the ideas of fairness and the notion of practicability. Essentially the same result was achieved on the Continent by the
efforts of such systematic thinkers as Grotius and Pufendorf. The test of reason
finaly asserted itself in the great European codifications which, in certain situations, call upon natural law and natural justice. Also, the judicial tradition on
the Continent, which handed down from generation to generation the "Idea of
Law" in its changing content and form as newly arising circumstances and
conditions demanded, was based on an implied reference to natural law. Having
this constant corrective-natural law understood as the law of reason-there
was no particular need in England for revolutions, the reception of foreign laws,
or for large scale codifications.
Another aspect of natural law becomes evident in Equity, which originally
1. Tarzmp, op. cit. at 34.
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was an appeal to natural justice, or to be more exact, an appeal to the individual
sense of justice of the individual Chancellor. But here, too, we can see the
strong formative or systematizing effects and influences of natural law ideas
which in the end reduced Equity to a system. Thieme rightly quotes 2 from
Maine's Ancient Law (pp. 48 If.), where Maine ascribes the hardening of Equity
into a system to the influence of those "mixed systems of jurisprudence and
morals, constructed by the publicists of the Low Countries."
In the United States the tests of natural law and Equity, the appeals to
reason as well as to natural justice never have lost their basic importance as the
foundation of a living law.
What, then, were the most significant changes which natural law ideas
carried into the modem Continental codifications as well as into the AngloSaxon law? Most important, perhaps, were the civil law guarantees of the
Rights of Man. Hence, it appears that the systematists had not labored in vain
when they pointed to the limits to the coerciveness of the positive law. And
the analysts were correct when they referred to a law "above" or "beyond" the
positive law. The jura connata (Wolff), the inherent rights of the natural law,
such as liberty, equality, and security, were gradually received into the positive
law. Thus, feudal privileges were abolished; the legal status of illegitimate
children was greatly improved; legal protection was granted to the foreign born;
Jews were legally emancipated; serfdom was abolished; and the beginnings of
the right to privacy can be noted. In the law of domestic relations we can
see the gradual emancipation of the wife from traditional thralldom; a reform
of the parental powers; and a liberalizing trend in the marriage laws. In the
law of hereditary succession the power to freely dispose of property as well as
the right to natural succession was favored. In the law of real property we
see the abolition of all feudal restrictions upon the alienation of land. In the
law of contracts all impediments which obstructed the free flow of commerce
were done away with. Freedom of trade and commerce, freedom of contract,
freedom in matters touching upon the rate of interests, etc., became universally
recognized.
All these rights (and privileges) became part of the positive law. It is
exactly these novel aspects of the law which gave a distinct unity to the codifications of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. On the whole, two
basic types of legal codifications came into being as the result of natural law
ideas: those codes which, due to the influence of Montesquieu, take account of
the historical background and the economic and social environment-though
faithful to the general principles of natural law, they endeavor to do justice to
the specific conditions of time and place; and these codifications which ignore
all historical or sociological factors. The legislation of the French Republic, for
instance, was completely "a-historical," while the Code Napolion made a conscious effort to maintain a close connection with the institutions of the ancient
regime.
How, then, did the great codifications such as the Austrian Aligemeines
Brirgerliches Gesetzbuch, the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, or the French
2. Txirmu,

op. cit. note 22 at 37.
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Code Napoldon influence the development of legal science? It could be
maintained that, on the whole, they encouraged a trend in the direction of legal
positivism, a trend which became manifest in legal exegesis and legal interpolation
of the codified law. The whole of legal wisdom seemed to have been relegated
to law books. Under the influence of Hegel and Darwin, who glorified that
which exists as reasonable or successful precisely because it exists, a trend of
shallow legal positivism became prevalent during the nineteenth century.
The present reviewer wishes to call to the attention of Professor Thieme
that although it is true that it was Stammler who popularized greatly the idea
of a return to natural law, it was Leon Petrazhytski, the Polish legal philosopher,
who laid down the scientific and lego-political foundations of the present-day
revival of natural law.S
We should welcome this short work by Thieme as a harbinger of new ideas.
Perhaps the present isolation of mankind, divided as it is into separate states,
constitutes only a transitory episode. Maybe a time will come again when the
supremacy of the universal natural law, the voice of conscience and reason,
once more will prevail over the present Babylonian confusion.
ZYGMUNT EPSTEIN

3. 2 Lehre vom Einkommen, Anhang: Zivilpolitik und Politische Okonomie 437 ff.
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To LIFE. By A. Delafield Smith. Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 204. $3.50.

RIGHT

This unusual and provocative book deserves to be noticed by those who are
interested in natural law. It has important implications especially for those
who are concerned with the application of natural law in legislation and politics.
Mr. Smith, the Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, explores the ethico-legal foundation of the individual's
claims upon the resources of society. He is concerned, on the one hand, with
man's need for security, and argues persuasively that "a calm, undisturbed faith
in the sustaining responsiveness of life's environment" is indispensable to human
and societal progress.1 On the other hand, he asserts the need of the individual
for freedom.
It is not a mere question, therefore, of meeting the fundamental needs
of life. The terms and conditions under which such needs are met will
determine whether we are to promote the development of a healthy
and dominant personality in our society or continue to undermine and
destroy self-esteem and degrade human character. 2
The author proposes a system for reconciling these two competing forces: security
and freedom. The reconciliation, he says, can be achieved only through law. We
must first be able to affirm that the individual has a right to whatever he needs
1.

SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE

2. Id. 19.
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(1955).
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for a decent human existence. This affirmation will have two consequences:
society will not be justified in withholding these necessities from him arbitrarily;
and the individual will have no cause to feel or become dependent and
inferior when he accepts them.
I shall have more to say later about the manner in which the author
establishes this right to call upon society for the necessities of human existence.
Suffice it to say now that once this fundamental premise is granted, a remarkable
vista opens. The doctrine of equal protection of the laws would be more
frequently invoked against undesirable statutory patterns of public assistance and
discriminatory action on the part of welfare administrators. Need would become
the principal basis for assistance. An opportunity would arise to re-examine
ingrained welfare concepts about the "worthiness" of welfare recipients, enforcement of support by estranged relatives, residence requirements and payment-inkind. Social workers could be relieved of policing functions which hinder their
work and their recognition as professionals.
At the same time, the needy might be spared some of the intrusion of government in their private lives, for they would not have to dance to government's tune
in order to qualify for assistance. Private guardianship of minors and incompetents would replace institutionalism and administrative supervision.
The individual would remain free and responsible, his will unbroken by the
superior will of government.
In stating his original thesis that men require both security and freedom
and in developing the ramifications of his system, Smith often expresses himself
in natural law terms. Though his work is purportedly the distillation of his
personal philosophy, it is very close to natural law. The author appeals, expressly or otherwise, throughout most of his book to a "basic substratum of law"
by which the legitimacy of positive law can be determined.$ His conclusions,
which seem to be principally derived from the nature of man and society, are
exalted in concept and stirringly presented.
At the second stage of his argument, however, the author abandons the
natural law approach. When he attempts to establish the individual's right
to call upon society for assistance, he appeals not to the nature of man and
society but rather to the development of society since the Industrial Revolution.
Prior to that time, Smith argues, the individual was able to satisfy all of his
needs directly, but now he is dependent on others for the satisfaction of the
major part of these needs. Society's obligation to respond to his cry for help
arises from the fact that it has deprived the individual of the "firm commitment" that he had from nature during the centuries before society became
mechanized and occupations specialized. 4
The argument is novel and subtle, but it does not hold water. The complexity of society may affect the kind and amount of assistance that the individual may claim and the range of persons from whom he may claim it, but
it would not appear to create the right. Certainly the obligation to assist the
needy predated the Industrial Revolution. If the family breadwinner in. the
3. Id. 94.
4.

Id. 9-22.
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Middle Ages, or even in the Stone Age, became incapacitated or died, those
able to help were morally obliged to assist the needy or bereaved family.
And if some cataclysm should tomorrow wipe out our industrialized society and
leave but a handful of struggling humans on the face of the earth, they would
have an obligation to render mutual assistance.
To put it another way, societal changes have only accentuated the underlying
obligation of members of a society to assist one another. It may be conceded
that many persons who might have been more successful in the simpler state
of nature stand confused and helpless in our complex civilization. For them, the
primeval jungle has been replaced by a more inimical environment: the technological jungle. Nevertheless, the obligation of society to help these unfortunates and their corresponding right to demand help arise from a relationship
more basic than that described by Smith-the brotherhood of man.
If the author had not abandoned the natural law approach in favor of the
historical at this stage of his argument, I think that he would have remained
on safer ground. The nature of man would appear to afford an unshakeable
foundation for the right of the needy to call upon society for aid.
Nevertheless it is easy to surmise why the author may have considered it
necessary to abandon a natural law approach at this point. The most vociferous
and popularly-acclaimed American exponents of natural law in the last two
decades seem to have reached conclusions contrary, in the main, to Smith's noble
and sympathetic conceptions. They have often espoused a political ultraconservatism inconsistent with the maintenance of public welfare programs, at
the same time implying that these political convictions flowed necessarily from
natural law principles.
I have before me a copy of the proceedings of the Natural Law Institute
held in 1950 at this university. 5 That institute met to consider the question
of human rights from the viewpoint of natural law. Papers were presented by
a number of jurists, educators, and writers who are noted in this country for
their natural law leanings. When these papers departed from generalities and
came to the concrete application of natural law, they contained not a single
favorable reference to public welfare programs. The speakers criticized the
inadequate philosophical principles of the so-called "Liberalists" of the New
DealO and the "sophisticated positivists, the skeptical pragmatists, the creeping
socialists (and) the social planners of all shades," 7 but offered no assurance that
in discarding wrongly-motivated humanitarianism they had not also discarded
all humanitarianism. In fact, the indications are that the speakers may have
done just that. I cannot tell whether cheers or boos greeted the statement of
one participant that "a Congress that does little, thus encouraging the people to
do more for themselves, is thereby fulfilling the highest American ideal, of
individual liberty and collective freedom."s But I can say that the tenor of
5.

4 UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (Notre

1951).
6. Id. 39.
7. Id. 47.
8. Id. 93.
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the other talks leads me to believe that the other speakers may well have nodded
their heads in agreement at this bon mot.
These and many similar examples of the use of the "meat-cleaver approach to
natural law" 9 to justify ultraconservative political prepossessions have received
wide publicity in the United States. They have probably alienated a large
number of intelligent Americans who might otherwise have pursued further an
investigation of the relevance of natural law to present-day problems. As I
have already indicated, a fear that natural law adherents are almost universally
insensitive to societal obligations may have caused Smith to veer away unconsciously from natural law considerations at the crucial stage of his argument.
If my surmise has some element of truth, it would seem to indicate that
those who seek to convince Americans of the worth of natural law must first
take affirmative steps to correct this misconception. The social-minded probably
need assurance at the present time that we do not reserve our highest accolades
for those who would advocate a return to laissez faire and "rugged individualism."
Philosophy is an affair of the heart as well as of the head. If they are forced
to a choice, many sincere persons will prefer even a soft-minded philosophy to
a hardhearted philosopher.
American natural law adherents of liberal sympathies--especially those of
the Catholic faith, since Catholics seem to be oftenest to blame in this matter
-- owe their compatriots an obligation to reaffirm their conviction that natural
law is not committed to any political theory, least of all to one that would
deny succor to the needy and suffering in the name of individualism. Only
then will the presently-disinterested be ready to listen with respect to whatever
else we have to say.
CoNRAD L. KELLENBERO
9. Cf. 1 NATURAL LAW FORUM 1 (1956).

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECurITY PROGRAM OF THE

AssOcIATION

OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1956. Pp. xxvi, 301. $5.00.
In this very informative and remarkably clear report, nine distinguished
lawyers' examine the five federal civilian personnel security programs 2 now
in operation and find them wanting in a number of important respects. The
result of their study is a list of recommendations for improving and strengthening
the general security program. The recommendations look toward the elimination of two of the present programs and a radical reduction in the scope of the
1. Dudley B. Bonsal, Chairman, Henry J. Friendly, Harold M. Kennedy, George Roberts,
and Whitney N. Seymour, of New York; Richard Bently, of Chicago; Frederick M. Bradley,
of Washington; Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans; John O'Melveny, of Los Angeles.
The Committee's staff was headed by Professor Elliott B. Cheatham, Columbia Law
School, and Professor Jerre S. Williams, University of Texas Law School. Expenses for
the study were provided by a grant from the Fund for the Republic.
2. The Personnel Security Program for Federal Employees, the security program administered by the Atomic Energy Commission, The Department of Defense Industrial Security
Program, the Port Security Program, and the International Employees Loyalty Board.
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remaining three. What survives is to be placed under the general supervision
of a proposed Director of Personnel and Information Security. A minor revision
is suggested in the standard to be used for determining trustworthiness, and
the new standard is to be made uniform for all programs. Finally, each program is to be subject to a number of important procedural safeguards, the
detailing of which consumes fully two thirds of the Committee's recommendations.
The Report experiences little difficulty in arriving at the preliminary finding
of a need for some kind of personnel security program. A brief sketch of the
Communist threat, with emphasis upon the successful use by its agents of the
technique of penetrating from within, is deemed sufficient for the purpose.
The need established, a bit perfunctorily, some may feel, the Report addresses
itself to the heart of the problem of erecting an effective personnel security
program:
We must never forget that the very purpose of national security is to preserve our independence and liberty and not merely to combat the greatest
present danger to it, Communism. The reconciliation and combination of
such seemingly opposed elements as security and liberty is the mark of every
successful social organization, from the family . . . to a great nation. (p. 43)

The Committee concludes that existing personnel security programs adequately guard national security. Its recommendations for change are on the
side of greater protection for the individual. With a few important reservations,
the result appears to be a clear net gain for both security and 1.iberty.
Scope of the programs.-Approximately six million positions in government
and industry now require security clearance for those who hold or apply for
them. 3 Included in that number are all employees in the Executive branch of
the Government; employees of contractors with the military services and the
Atomic Energy Commission whose duties require access to classified information;
seamen on American vessels; longshoremen employed in areas designated as
restricted; and American citizens employed by public international organizations. The Committee recommends that the scope of the programs be drastically reduced by extending their coverage to sensitive positions only and by
defining as sensitive those positions which involve access to secret or top-secret
material or which permit occupants to make policy decisions bearing a substantial relation to national security. Restriction of the programs to sensitive
positions as thus defined would result in the virtual elimination of two which
are now in operation, the Port Security Program, covering seamen and longshoremen, and the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board, covering
employees of public international organizations. The Committee estimates that
if its test of sensitivity is applied to all positions now covered by security programs,
the number requiring clearance will be reduced from six million to one and onehalf million.
Clearly, effective reform of existing programs must begin with a drastic
3.

The decision in Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956), which in effect restricts the

Federal Employees Program to sensitive positions, has not materially changed this figure,
which is taken from the Report. Most of the employees who were thereby released from
the operation of that program are still subject to the loyalty test contained in the general

civil service regulations.
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reduction in the number of positions subject to security clearance. Security is
best served by directing the energies of the necessarily limited number of investigators to positions which can be exploited with profit by an enemy. Liberty
of the individual is best served by placing as many persons as possible beyond
the reach of programs which at best will result in injustice and hardship to
some. It may well be doubted whether as many as a million and a half employees need be covered by the programs. This figure is based on estimates
furnished by government officials. The Director of Security of the Department
of Defense estimated that, in the words of the Report, "only about 800,000
positions in its industrial security program involve access to 'top-secret' and
'secret' information." One wonders what Alice would have said upon being
informed that the secrets of the Department for the Defense of Wonderland
were accessible to only 800,000 persons. The principle urged by the Committee is a sound one, but it must be implemented by a realistic study of
exactly what our secrets are and who are in positions to affect their use.
Standards and Criteria.-Thestandard employed in the first general employee
security program, which was brought into being by President Truman's Executive
Order 9835, was that "on all the evidence ... reasonable grounds exist for belief
that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." A
1951 amendment changed the standard to read that "on all the evidence there is
reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of
the United States." President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450 abolished
the Truman program. That order directed the head of each agency or department "to insure that the employment and retention in employment is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security." Some variation of the national
security test is now used in all programs except that for international employees,
which uses the loyalty test.
The Committee suggests that the standard be "whether or not in the
interest of the United States the employment or retention in employment of
the individual is advisable." It deliberately avoids inserting "clearly" before
"advisable" in the belief that the present standard is subject to abuse at the
expense of the employee if applied by "unduly literal minded" administrators.
The proposed standard continues the trend toward a broader test which in
theory places less stigma on those who cannot pass it. The qualification is
necessary because unfortunately the public cannot be brought to distinguish
security proceedings from the older loyalty hearings. Whether, as the Committee
believes, the confusion results from use of the term loyalty in the original
program, or whether, as seems quite likely, it stems from the fact that the
present program followed hard on the heels of campaign promises to rid the
Government of Communists, confusion it certainly is. And in view of that confusion, it may be wondered whether the employee's right to the respect of his
community is not better protected by the harsher sounding loyalty test. At least
that test compelled those who sat in judgment to look squarely at the seriousness
of their determination.
A significant recommendation respecting criteria is that the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations be abolished, unless it is modified along lines
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which the Committee suggests. In view of the positive finding that "abolition
of the list would not weaken in the slightest the aid which the Department
of Justice could and should give to the executive departments in the enforcement of the personnel security programs" (p. 157), it is difficult to justify the
list however modified. The Committee notes that the mere fact of membership in a listed organization seems at times to have been taken as a ground
for disqualification, and it will certainly be ever difficult to persuade those
"unduly literal minded" persons over whom concern is expressed elsewhere in
the Report that membership can be quite consistent with trustworthiness.
Procedure.-The most significant proposal for procedural reform is the
establishment of a central screening board in the Civil Service Commission.
The board alone is to determine whether security charges are to be filed, a
function now exercised as to its own employees by each of the seventy-odd
executive agencies. Before the board determines that charges should, be filed,
the employee is to be given an opportunity for an informal conference, with
benefit of counsel. The lack of procedure for careful attention to the question
of whether security charges ought to be filed at all 'has been a source of frequent
and well justified criticism in the past. Once charges are filed, a great deal of
damage is done, even though on examination they turn out to be groundless.
In the commentary accompanying the recommendations for screening procedure the Committee urges that the screening board refrain from issuing charges
in a case until it determines that the case is truly a security matter and not one
which can be effectively disposed of under the general suitability provisions
of the civil service regulations. This is an important point, and perhaps it
ought to have been incorporated in the text of the recommendation. It is
designed to end the practice of placing the "security risk" tag on a variety
of unsuitable employees whose shortcomings are only tangentially related to
the question of their trustworthiness. There are sound reasons why alcoholics,
homosexuals, and ex-criminals ought to be excluded from sensitive positions,
but there is no need to bring the security machinery to bear on them. To
eliminate completely the use of the machinery in such cases, the substance of the
suitability requirements of the civil service regulations should be 'incorporated
in regulations covering noncompetitive positions in government and positions
in private industry affected by the security programs.
The wisdom and fairness of the screening procedure are so manifest that
it may well be wondered why any other system has been tolerated. So it is
with the other proposals for procedural reform. Employees suspended pending
determination as to clearance are to continue to receive their salaries, and,
where possible, are to be transferred to nonsensitive positions without loss of pay.
Subpoena power is given to the screening board and to the several hearing
boards, which are to receive for determination the cases of employees charged by
the screening boards. Hearing boards are to furnish written findings of fact and
conclusions to the charged employee. If the employee is cleared he is to be
reimbursed in the amount of a reasonable fee for his attorney.
Viewed as a whole, the proposals for procedural reform go far to justify
the Committee's enthusiastic conclusion that, upon their adoption, "no
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reasonable citizen could feel that this [national security] was being achieved
at the sacrifice of our basic principles of liberty and our sense of fairness." And
certainly any criticism of the Report must take into account the desire of the
Committee to do a good deal more than to draft an ideal personnel security
program. It wanted a program which would be acceptable to very nearly all
shades of opinion on a much disputed subject. It doubtless hoped to influence
the forthcoming report of the Commission on Government Security, appointed
to study the field by a Joint Resolution of Congress in 1955, a hope shared by
those who are interested in a less restrictive program. Yet with all due regard
for the delicacy of the endeavor, the Report seems to go too far in one vital
direction and not far enough in two rather important ones.
Its recommendations on the question of whether the charged employee is
to be permitted to confront his accusers goes too far. Not only undercover
agents but even casual informers are to be shielded whenever a shield is
deemed necessary to the maintenance of an effective security program. It is
easy to agree with the Committee that in the great bulk of security cases confrontation is unimportant because the facts are admitted by the charged employee. But as the Committee itself concludes:
Yet it is small solace to the individual, when confrontation is important in
his case to know that in many cases it is not. Each individual is entitled
to fair play. (p. 176)
Use of the "faceless informer" is not confined to security cases. It has
entered into other administrative proceedings, most notably into conscientious
objector and deportation proceedings. For the moment at least, the practice
has been permitted in those areas by the Supreme Court, over the sharp protests
of a sizeable minority. But whether or not it receives ultimate constitutional
sanction, it is a vicious practice, one at war with the most fundamental notions
of fair play, and one which ought to be confined to cases in which its use
is absolutely compelled.
The Committee agrees, but it feels that in some security cases use of the undisclosed informer is justified. Its argument has considerable force so long as it
is restricted to defending the anonymity of undercover agents. And even there
one wonders. Would it not be possible, as others have suggested, to afford the
charged employee at least a part of the benefit of cross-examination by permitting
a representative having the requisite security clearance to confront and crossexamine the witness? Or why not provide that in any case where it is necessary to
deny the right of confrontation, the hearing board and the agency head shall
be powerless to make an adverse determination, but must order the employee transferred to a nonsensitive position? But regardless of the merits of shielding undercover agents, protection of casual informers cannot in final analysis be defended
in terms of national security. National safety is jeopardized, not secured, when
we put those who serve the Government at the mercy of persons who are not
willing to be identified with the charges they bring. It is positively distressing
to be told, by way of justification, that "even casual informants would not
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give information if confrontation were required." If that is so, we are really
in peril; but the insidious agents who have placed us there are our -own
irresponsible citizens.
On two counts the recommendations of the Report appear to fall short.
Why assign to the head of the employer-agency the task of making the final
determination as to whether the charged employee is to be retained? The
Committee feels that the agency head should have the last word because he
knows the demands of the position held by the employee and because he is
charged with responsibility for the successful operation of his agency. Neither
reason seems to warrant making the judgment of the hearing board amount
to a mere recommendation. The agency head can pass on to the board his
views on the sensitivity of the position. Indeed he must do so in every case
if the board is properly to apply the proposed standard. Responsibility for the
operation of the agency rests with him, but he can most effectively discharge
his responsibility in the personnel security area by a careful choice of appointments to the hearing board of his agency. On the other hand, why all the
admirable procedural machinery designed to make the hearing resemble a
judicial trial, if the head of the agency is to be permitted to make an arbitrary
determination without reference to what the hearing board decides? Even if
the agency head were to adopt the finding of the board as his own as a matter
of policy, it would still seem wise to insulate him completely from the kind of
pressure to which agency heads have been subjected in the past.
The Committee's final recommendation concerns the rights of applicants
and probationary employees. Under present programs applicants about whom
adverse security information is already on file may be denied employment without any explanation. The report well describes their plight:
In consequence, such applicants may be continually denied positions, perhaps throughout their lives, because of adverse security information conmined in their personnel files about which they know nothing and to which
they could give a completely satisfactory answer if opportunity were
afforded. (p. 186)
The Committee finds their treatment both unfair and wasteful. It recommends
that an applicant for a position covered by the programs who is denied employment should, upon request, be furnished a statement of all adverse security
information concerning him or a statement that there is no such adverse
information. The applicant is to be given the right to file an affidavit denying
or explaining the information, and the affidavit is to be made part of the file.
If his employment by the agency is deemed important by its general counsel,
an applicant can get an informal interview to explain adverse security information. This last privilege is also extended to probationary employees, who
already enjoy the first two.
The recommendations would effect a significant reform. But why not extend
to applicants and probationary employees the same right to the screening procedure and the hearing as that enjoyed by permanent employees? The Corn-
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mittee weighs the possibility, but concludes that extension would be a danger
to effective administration:
Many persons could avail themselves of these procedures when prospects
for employment were almost nonexistent, or only for the purpose of clearing
their records with no intention of pressing the application for employment
after clearance. It is desirable to avoid adding to the burden of government
by making security procedures available to all applicants. (p. 187)
The argument here is quite weak. It rests on nothing more than an assertion as to what many people could do, and even that without any indication
as to how many "many" amounts to. But suppose that there are literally
thousands who are anxious to clear their names and who are willing to use
the machinery of the programs for that purpose. Should they be denied the
opportunity to do so for no better reason than that the burdens of government
would be thereby increased? If the added burden can be discharged by the
appointment of additional screening and hearing personnel, that course obviously
ought to be followed. It is conceivable, though not likely, that in the beginning
a flood of requests by applicants for hearings could temporarily disrupt orderly
operation of the programs. But that problem could be solved by awarding
priority to cases involving permanent employees and taking applicants and
probationary employees on a first requested, first heard basis.
It is always difficult to quarrel with the generous over their not having
given more, and that is the uneasy task of any critic of the Report. The aim
of the Report was high-nothing less than the reconciliation of the competing
claims of security and freedom in very fearful days. If the mark was not quite
reached, the fault is doubtless with the times.
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